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CAPACITY RESTRICTION BY RETAILERS 
 








A monopolist retailer facing two suppliers producing two symmetric and 
independent goods improves its bargaining position by commiting to sell only one good. 
We analyze if this advantage extends to the case where there are two undifferentiated 
retailers competing in the same market. With linear supply contracts, we have partial 
capacity restriction in the sense that only one retailer commits to sell only one good. 
Then, we have that if retailers were to merge, welfare would decrease because the 
merger reduces the variety of goods available to consumers. 
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In the last few years, concentration in the retailing sector has increased very much. This has
been the result of a huge number of both national and cross-border mergers. This trend has
raised the concern of antitrust authorities for their possible negative e⁄ect on welfare. Apart
from the well-known e⁄ect they can have on ￿nal prices, retail mergers are investigated because
they may increase the bargaining power of retailers vis-￿-vis suppliers.
One of the worries is that this higher bargaining power may be achieved by delisting some
of the goods ￿rms were selling before merger. This will harm welfare, because it will reduce the
variety of goods consumers can buy.
Delisting can be a rational strategy, because retailers committing to limit the number of goods
they will sell can obtain price discounts from suppliers. In other words, retailers can obtain price
discounts by forcing suppliers to compete for the scarce shelf space. Those incentives can be
illustrated in the following simple example taken from Gabrielsen and Sorgard (1999). Suppose
we have two symmetric upstream ￿rms producing two independent goods. They sell the good
through a monopolist retailer. If the retailer takes both goods, each supplier will set wholesale
prices above marginal cost. However if the retailer commits to take only one good, competition
between suppliers will drive the wholesale price to marginal cost. In a linear example, this latter
strategy gives more pro￿ts to the retailer.
However, delisting will only occur after merger if those incentives to limit the number of
goods increase as competition decreases. This is indeed what we obtain in this paper. When we
add a competitor in the retailing sector in the example above, we obtain that only one retailer
limit the number of goods she wants to sell. Therefore, both goods are sold before merger:
reducing competition in the retailing sector reduces the variety of goods o⁄ered to consumers.
2Although the merger reduces wholesale prices the e⁄ect on variety dominates and the merger
reduces welfare.
The most closely related paper to ours is Gabrielsen and Sorgard (1999). They analyze the
case where there is one retailer and two suppliers that use linear supply contracts. Goods
are substitutes and one of the goods has a larger demand. The retailer chooses to take one
good (require exclusivity) if goods are su¢ ciently symmetric. My paper extends Gabrielsen and
Sorgard (1999) to allow for a competitor retailer while simplifying the demand side.
Inderst and Sha⁄er (2007) also analyze the e⁄ect of mergers of retailers on variety. The
reduction of variety is explained by the same mechanism as in our paper. The monopolist
increases its pro￿ts by committing to buy only one of the goods o⁄ered by suppliers. The
di⁄erence is that they consider mergers of non-competing retailers while we focus on the case
where retailers that merge compete in the same market. Dana (2006) shows that buyer groups
obtain better terms of trade if they are composed by buyers with heterogeneous preferences and
they commit to be supplied by a single seller. Here, buyers are ￿nal consumers and therefore
they do not compete in the market.
In the next section, we consider the basic model where suppliers set linear contracts. We
consider two cases depending on whether price discrimination is allowed. In the third section,
we consider the same model but with two-part tari⁄supply contracts. Final conclusions put the
paper to an end.
2 Linear contracts
Assume we have two producers (1 and 2). Producer 1 (2) produces good 1 (2). Goods 1 and
2 are independent. Demand of good i (i=1,2) is given by Pi = a ￿ Qi, where Pi and Qi are
respectively the price and the quantity sold of good i. Goods should be sold through two retailers
3(1 and 2). To simplify things, we assume that there are no costs of production and retailing.
The crucial ingredient of our paper is that through shop design or other related mechanism
the retailers can commit to the number of goods they will sell (0,1 or 2), before suppliers specify
the supply contracts. The idea is that by restricting the selling capacity, retailers may indeed
induce a reduction in wholesale prices. This is what we want to check next.
In this section, we assume that supply contracts only include a wholesale price that can be
di⁄erent for each retailer. Section 3 solves the model for the case with two-part tari⁄ supply
contracts. Furthermore, we assume that retailers compete ￿ la Cournot.
Then we study the following four stage game:
In the ￿rst stage, retailers decide how many goods to carry. In the second stage, suppliers
decide on the wholesale price to o⁄er to each retailer. In the third stage, retailers that have
chosen to carry only one good decide which good to sell. In the last stage, retailers decide how
many units to buy from suppliers and how many units to sell in the market.
Next we analyze the game after retailers have decided how many goods to carry. We sum-
marize the decision of the ￿rst stage with a vector, where the ￿rst component is the number
of goods that retailer 1 decides to carry and the second component the goods that retailer 2
decides to carry.
If the decision in the ￿rst stage amounts to (2,2), i.e. retailers decide not to restrict the
selling capacity, the results of the game are well-known. In this case, the markets are completely









a ￿ 2wi2 + wi1
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If only one retailer decides to carry one good (1,0), we have that the competition between
producers to be selected by this retailer drives the wholesale prices to zero. Therefore, we have





Next we analyze the two cases that are left (1,2) and (1,1). In both cases we have that both
retailers participate but we have restriction in the selling capacity.
In the case1 (1,2), we have that by restricting capacity, retailer 1 obtains a reduction in the
wholesale price. In equilibrium we have that w11 = w21 = a
4 and w21 = w22 = a
2 (Appendix 1).
This reduction in the wholesale price translates into higher pro￿ts. The retailer that sells only














R, we have that specialized shops are more pro￿table than generalists shops. The
reason is that variety is obtained at the cost of higher wholesale prices.
Then the last subgame to analyze is when both retailers have restricted the selling capacity
(1,1). In this case, we have that in equilibrium each retailer sells a di⁄erent good and they pay
a wholesale price of
a
2
(Appendix 2). It is like if both markets are separated and producers





The following payo⁄ matrix describes the game in the ￿rst stage. Although retailers can
choose not to carry any good, this option has not been included in the matrix, because it is a
strictly weakly dominated strategy.






























Proposition 1 In equilibrium, we have partial capacity restriction: one retailer decides to o⁄er
one good while the competitor o⁄ers two.
Then in equilibrium we have that only one retailer decides to restrict selling capacity. There-
fore, we have the coexistence of specialized and generalist retailers. The asymmetric equilibrium
prevails because the generalist shop would not obtain a reduction in the wholesale price if she
was to reduce further selling capacity. It would only obtain a reduction in variety. We have
that welfare is maximized in (2,2). Therefore, the restriction of selling capacity is detrimental
for society.
The main object of the paper is to analyze the e⁄ect of the merger of both retailers. If
retailers merge, they will decide to commit to take only one good. Then the competition




that is higher than the joint pro￿ts the merged ￿rms obtained before the merger i.e. the merger
is pro￿table. As far as welfare is concerned, we have that the merger has the positive e⁄ect of
reducing wholesale prices and the negative e⁄ect of both reducing competition and variety. We
obtain the negative e⁄ect dominates and the merger reduces welfare. This result is stated in the
next proposition:
Proposition 2 The merger of the two retailers reduces variety and welfare.
62.1 Without price discrimination
In the previous Section, producers were allowed to charge di⁄erent wholesale prices to retailers.
However, this may turn to be illegal. For example the Robert-Patman Act, forbids price dis-
crimination in the input market in order to protect small businesses. In this section, we re do
the calculations of the previous section for the case where price discrimination is not allowed.
Observe that in this case, a retailer may be less interested in reducing selling capacity, because
she knows that any reduction in the wholesale price has to be shared with the competing retailer.
In the subgame where no retailer has reduced the selling capacity (2,2), the equilibrium of
the previous section involved no price discrimination. Therefore, forbidding price discrimination
will not change the equilibrium.
In the subgame, where both retailers have reduced the selling capacity (1,1), in the previous
section we had an equilibrium without price discrimination w11 = w21 = w12 = w22 = a
2. It
should also be an equilibrium now, because forbidding price discrimination can not increase the
pro￿ts of deviations. A producer to serve both retailers should reduce the wholesale price to a
4,
but this deviation do not increase the payo⁄. This equilibrium implies the same payo⁄s as the
case where price discrimination was not forbidden.
Things change radically when only one retailer, say 1, has reduced its selling capacity (1,2).
In this case, producers have to compete for the capacity of retailer 1, without the ability to
grant her particular discounts. The situation is similar to Varian (1980) where ￿rms face both
captive and informed consumers. As in this case, no pure strategy equilibrium exists in the
pricing stage. Next lemma describes the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium.
Lemma 1 When only one retailer has reduced its selling capacity, producers randomize in
wholesale prices, in equilibrium according to the following distribution function:
7F(w) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :












1 if w ￿
a
2
Focusing on retailer 2, a producer can obtain
a2
8
by setting wi =
a
2
. Those are the expected
pro￿ts she obtains in equilibrium: the additional pro￿ts that can be obtained by serving retailer
1 are dissipated by competition. Observe that
a
4
is the lowest wholesale price such that, serving




We assume that prices are realized at the beginning of stage 3. Then retailer1 will choose to
o⁄er the good whose wholesale price is lower. To solve the ￿rst stage we have tho calculate the








































Then we still have that the equilibrium is (1,2) (or (2,1)). The di⁄erence is that now, because
price discrimination is not allowed, the specialized ￿rm earns less pro￿ts than the generalist
retailer. The reduction obtained by restricting capacity is so important that is the optimal
strategy, although price cuts have to be shared with the competitor.
3 Two-part tari⁄
We analyze the same four stage game as in the previous Section but we consider that supply
contracts take the form of two-part tari⁄s including a wholesale price and a nonnegative ￿xed
8fee. The important di⁄erence between the two cases is that with linear contracts, producers
value retailers competition, because it reduces the double marginalization problem. This is not
the case with two part-tari⁄ contracts. A producer obtains the same pro￿ts with one or two
retailers.
This explains that solving the game is simple when there is one retailer that carries two
goods. Upstream ￿rms abandon the other downstream ￿rms (setting an in￿nite ￿xed fee) and
extract the monopoly pro￿ts setting appropriate two part tari⁄s to the downstream ￿rms that
has chosen to sell two goods. Producers have enough with one retailer that sells two goods. The
existence of the other retailer does not increase their pro￿tability.
Perhaps more surprisingly, we obtain (see Appendix 3) the same result when each retailer
o⁄ers only one good. Producers distribute the good through a di⁄erent retailer, but they are
able to extract the full monopoly pro￿ts.
Given that, whenever both retailers participate, they obtain zero pro￿ts, not participation is
not any more a strictly weakly dominated strategy and therefore it can be chosen in equilibrium.
Therefore, we have to study the cases where this option is chosen. If one retailer o⁄ers one good
and the other none (1,0), producers compete for the only slot available and this competitions
drives the wholesale price and the ￿xed fee to zero. Therefore, the upstream ￿rms obtain zero
pro￿ts and the downstream ￿rm the monopoly pro￿ts in one market2.
Given that retailers only obtain positive pro￿ts in (1,0), (0,1), we have multiplicity of equi-
libria in the ￿rst stage. The equilibria follow, (1,0), (0,1),(1,1),(2,1),(1,2),(2,2) where the ￿rst
component represents the number of goods chosen by downstream ￿rm 1 and the second compo-
nent the number of goods chosen by downstream ￿rm 2. In the two ￿rst equilibria the upstream
￿rms obtain zero pro￿ts. In the remaining equilibria, each upstream obtain the monopoly prof-
2This is the same result obtained with linear contracts.
9its in their market. However, if we introduce a positive but small cost to carry a good, only
(1,0) and (0,1) survive. Therefore, the incentive to reduce selling capacity are more intense with
two-part tari⁄, because retailers are less valuable to producers. Proposition 2 summarizes:
Proposition 3 With two-part tari⁄ and a small but positive cost of capacity, we have strong
capacity restriction: one retailer o⁄ers to sell a good and the other one quits the market.
4 Conclusions
We have studied the incentives of retailers to restrict the number of goods they sell in order to
obtain bargaining advantages over suppliers. We have obtained that these incentives increase
when competition in the retailing sector diminishes. Therefore one important consequence of
mergers is that they reduce the variety of goods available to consumers. This e⁄ect should be
taken into account when evaluating the impact of mergers on welfare.
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Each upstream may always obtain
a2
8
by choosing wi1 = a and wi2 =
a
2
. Then if, in
equilibrium, upstream i is not chosen by 1, then wi2 =
a
2
. Then we obtain the optimal wholesale


























If wi1 ￿ a
2, the constraint is not binding and w￿
j1 = w￿
j2 = a
2. If wi1 < a
2, then the solution is
w￿
j1 = wi1 and w￿
j2 = a
2. To check that these are the optimal wholesale prices, we have to check
that upstream j obtains more pro￿ts than by setting wj1 = a and wj2 =
a
2
. This is the case if
wi1 ￿ a
4. To close the construction of the equilibrium we have to check that upstream i choosing
wi1 and wi2 =
a
2
maximizes its payo⁄ given w￿
j1 = wi1 and w￿
j2 = a
2. The only thing to check
is whether he can obtain more pro￿ts by being chosen by retailer1. In order to do so, the best
thing is to set w0
i1 = wi1 ￿" and wi2 =
a
2




. Then, in equilibrium we have that w11 = w21 = a




In equilibrium, it should be the case that each retailer chooses a di⁄erent upstream ￿rm and
makes positive sales.
Assume that given a vector of wholesale prices, retailer k (l)chooses upstream i (j) and
wik ￿ wjl < a
2.
11If a ￿ 2wjk + wjl > 0, the upstream i increases its payo⁄ with w0
ik = a and w0
il = wjl + ",
where 0 < " < minfa
2 ￿ wjl;
a + wjl ￿ 2wjk
3
g. In this case, retailer k chooses upstream j and
retailer l chooses upstream i, because
￿









. Upstream i increases


















il = a. In this
case, retailer l chooses upstream j and retailer k chooses upstream i because it would obtain zero









Assume that given a vector of wholesale prices, retailer k (l)chooses upstream i (j) and
wik > a







a ￿ 2wjk + wjl
3
￿2
The upstream i increases its payo⁄ with w0
ik = a
2 and w0
il = a. Then the retailer l chooses










a ￿ 2wjk + wjl
3
￿2
Then, in equilibrium if retailer k (l)chooses upstream i (j), we must have that wik = wjl = a
2.
Then we obtain the values of wil = wjk so that we have indeed an equilibrium. We must have
that wil ￿ 3a
8 (wjk ￿ 3a
8 ) in order that retailer l (k) does not want to choose upstream i (j).
Furthermore we must have that wjk ￿ a
2(wil ￿ a
2) such that upstream i (j) does not want to
deviate and sell to both retailers.
126.3 Appendix 3
We analyze the case (1,1) with two-part tari⁄. Recall that the duopoly output is given by
q(w1;w2) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
a ￿ w1
2
if w1 < ￿a + 2w2
a ￿ 2w1 + w2
3




and the pro￿ts in equilibrium by (q(w1;w2))
2.






Proof. If the proposition does not hold, Ui obtains less than
￿a
2
￿2 and it has a pro￿table
deviation.
If (q(wjl;wjk))
2 ￿ Fjl and (q(wjk;wjl))







￿2 ￿ ". Then in the unique equilibrium Dk(l) chooses Uj(i) and Ui increases its payo⁄ for "
positive but low enough.
If (q(wjl;wjk))
2 ￿ Fjl and (q(wjk;wjl))











￿2 ￿ ". Then Ui is chosen by one retailer and increases its payo⁄ for " positive but
low enough.
If (q(wjl;wjk))
2 > Fjl and wik > 0, then if Ui deviates to w0
ik = 0;F0









il = 1, the only equilibrium is that Dk(l) chooses Ui(j). Observe that for











2 ￿Fjkg, where the last inequality comes from the fact
that Dk was choosing Ui in the candidate equilibrium. It is possible to check that Ui increases






















2 ￿ Fjkg, Ui could
deviate to w0
ik = 0;F0
ik = Fik + "; w0
il = 1;F0
il = 1. If " is positive but small enough we
13have that the only equilibrium is Dk(l) chooses Ui(j). Observe that for Dl is a strictly dominant







Ui increases its payo⁄.




Proof. According to Proposition 4, in an equilibrium where Dk(l) chooses Ui(j) we must have












￿2except when either (q(wjk;0))
2 ￿ Fjk > 0 or (q(wil;0))
2 ￿ Fil > 0
hold. We are going to see that in those cases there is a pro￿table deviation. Without loss of
generality, assume that (q(wjk;0))
2￿Fjk > 0 and (q(wjk;0))
2￿Fjk ￿ maxf0;(q(wil;0))
2￿Filg:




￿2. Suppose that Ui sets w0
ik = 1, F0
ik = 1,
w0












2 ￿ Filg + (q(wjk;0))








It is possible to check that the only equilibrium is that Dl(k) chooses Ui(j). For Dk is a strictly











2 ￿ Filg + " > (q(0;wjk))














Then it is possible to check that Ui increases the payo⁄, because F0
il > Fik.




1;F12 = 1;w21 = 1;F21 = 1;w22 = 0;F22 =
￿a
2
￿2.
14